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Abstract
How does market organization a¤ect quality innovation e¤orts
and social welfare? Three stochastic dynamic market structures con-
sidered are monopoly, duopoly, and social planning. Products can
be either linearly or nonlinearly substitutable. The introduction of
a step function allows richer innovation strategies. First, given non-
linear substitution, a duopoly may follow an unbalanced evolution
path and have a technology frontier not dominated by that in social
planning. This result does not hold for the linear substitution case.
Second, ex ante and long-run welfare values are always the highest
in social planning and the lowest in monopoly. Thus, policies should
encourage static and dynamic competition.
JEL Classication Numbers: D21, D43, D92, L13, L15, O31
Keywords: R&D, quality innovation, product supremacy
1 Introduction
Intel and AMD are currently two dominant makers of computer micro proces-
sors. These rms are respectively famous for Pentium and Athlon brands which
directly compete and have their own patent protection. Intel and AMD have
continuously improved the speed of these processors, racing against each other.
Quality innovation in the form of higher speeds in these products is a clear
example of technological progress. Between the two, a faster processor is more
valued by consumers and thus has supremacy over its competitor. Some similar
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instances with a small number of dominant rms who repeatedly improve their
product quality are the commercial jet market, the cellular phone market, etc.
Without races, technology may not progress that fast. However, quality im-
provements often come at huge Research and Development (R&D) costs, and
races may lead to wasteful investments. This welfare concern motivates the
study of an environment in which rms can improve their product quality over
time. More specically, rms spend on R&D to have superior blueprints accord-
ing to which new and better generations are produced. In this sense, techno-
logical progress rules out the possibility of depreciation. In addition, rms can
choose bounded continuous innovation steps for the next period. Conditional
on these technological assumptions, we address the following question: how
does market organization a¤ect quality innovation e¤orts and social welfare, in
the life-time horizon? Specically, the three market structures considered are
monopoly, duopoly, and social planning.
We are addressing an important and interesting question. First, it is widely
believed that technological progress is very important for improving quality of
life. Thus, understanding the innovation behaviors of di¤erent market structures
helps us designing policies for better outcomes. Second, answers to di¤erent
aspects of this question are not obvious at the face value. For example, if product
quality never depreciates, does a monopoly have an incentive to innovate at all,
as it does not face any competition? Do races for supremacy improve social
welfare as the speed of quality innovation accelerates, whereas more resources
are spent on R&D rather than on consumption? Without quality depreciation,
do we always see a duopoly market dominated by one rm and the laggard
never catching up with the front-runner? Third, as rms can choose continuous
steps for the next period, how does the innovation dynamics of di¤erent market
structures, especially that of the duopoly, look like?
There are some highlights about the methodology. First, know-how stocks,
or alternatively quality levels, constitute the state in the model. As mentioned
above, this state is endogenously driven and non-decreasing. For tractability,
we assume there is a threshold beyond which no rms can raise quality. Second,
rms can choose continuous steps rather than xed ones to push up quality, and
they face uncertainty in realizing those steps. Third, some equilibrium concepts
are needed for the duopoly. Every period, rms engage in price competition or
a Bertrand game. In addition, they base their R&D e¤orts on the state, and
interact according to the pure-strategy rst-order Markov Perfect Equilibrium
(MPE). The introduction of continuous innovation steps allows continuous price
ratios, and enriches R&D competition strategies in the duopoly. Fourth, the
dynamic game setup does not support analytical solutions, and needs to rely
on numerical characterizations. The threshold assumption helps us know the
solution far into the future. Based on this knowledge, a backward-induction
numerical algorithm is developed to solve the dynamic game. Fifth, to facilitate
welfare analyses, consumer utility takes on a quasi-linear form which absorbs
rm prots. In addition, welfare comparison is based on (i) ex ante discounted
life-time social welfare, and (ii) maximal long-run values. The terms maximal
or frontier only mean the boundary beyond which rms no longer innovate.
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With this methodology, there are some main ndings. First, when products
are linearly substitutable, the technology frontier is the highest in social plan-
ning, lower in duopoly, and the lowest in monopoly; In a not-too-old duopoly,
innovation investments are intensied when rms are neck-and-neck and allevi-
ated when rms are far apart. Second, however, these results do not hold for the
nonlinear substitution case. Specically, a duopoly may follow an unbalanced
evolution path and have a technology frontier not dominated by that in social
planning. Third, ex ante and long-run social welfare values are the highest in
social planning and the lowest in monopoly. This welfare ordering implies that
policies should encourage static and dynamic competition.
The vast game-theoretic R&D literature related to the current study can be
divided into three overlapping groups composed of some representative stud-
ies: (i) patent races with Scherer (1967), Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1980), Lee and Wilde (1980), Harris and Vickers (1985), Reinganum (1981,
1982), Grossman and Shapiro (1987), Harris and Vickers (1987), Lippman and
McCardle (1987), Klette and Griliches (2000), and Doraszelski (2003); (ii) tech-
nology ladder with Segerstrom et al (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991), and Aghion et al (2001); and (iii) MPE industry
dynamics with Pakes and McGuire (1994), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Pakes
and McGuire (2001), and Doraszelski and Markovich (2005).
The current paper deviates from those groups in several aspects. First, while
the patent races set xed prizes for R&D races, our model explicitly species
prots as product market outcomes, and the innovation process is repeated for
the desire of more and sustainable prots. Second, technology ladders are often
in the form of quality ladders on which the front-runner and many laggards are
one step apart; More importantly competitors only choose the probability to
progress one step. In our model, a laggard may choose a large step and surpass
the front-runner in the next period if the R&D project succeeds. Aghion et al
(2001) allow competitors to be a number of steps apart. However, the laggard
has to catch up with the front-runner before ghting for future leadership. In
addition, they model a race down the production cost ladder which is naturally
bounded from below by zero and has downward price e¤ects. Our setup implies
that quality innovation may bring about both larger market shares and higher
prices. Third, the current MPE industry dynamics models allow net-state vari-
ables to move (exogenously) backward as well as (endogenously) forward, and
eventually cycle in an ergodic set. Conceptually, no rm will dominate forever.
In addition, without entry and exit, a laggard may catch up some day with only
a little e¤ort. Our model has a non-decreasing state and allows the possibility
of permanent dominance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the primi-
tives of the environment. Section 3 describes innovation behaviors and welfare
properties of the three market structures. Section 4 characterizes the dynamic
results with numerical exercises. For simplicity, sections 3 and 4 focus on the lin-
ear substitution case. Non-linear substitution is considered in section 5 with the
intuition carried from the previous analyses. Section 6 discusses some modeling
issues. Finally, section 7 concludes with some remarks.
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2 Environment
This is an economy of discrete innite-time horizon. In this environment, two
rms X and Y can technically improve quality of their corresponding products
x and y to serve a unit measure of identical consumers. Besides x and y, there
is a product z acting as the numeraire.
2.1 Consumers
In each period, consumers are endowed with B units of the numeraire z. As
all of the products are perishable, consumers make static decisions to maximize
the one-period utility
max
x;y;z0
fu [(xx) + (yy)] + zg ;  2 (0; 1]
s.t. pxx+ pyy + z = B; (1)
where x, y, z are quantities of consumption; x and y are quality indices; 
is the substitution parameter; and u is a strictly concave function, specically
it takes the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form with rR =  2 [ 12 ; 1).
There are several highlighted features. First, as  ranges from above 0 to 1,
products x and y become increasingly closer substitutes. Second, the concav-
ity of function u() is necessary to accommodate the linear substitution case
in which  = 1. The reason why u() takes this CRRA class is to produce
unambiguous e¤ects and will be explained later. Third, budget B is assumed
to be large enough so that z > 0 always holds in equilibrium. This condition
guarantees that a monopoly rm will never charge an innite price. Fourth, in
this specication, the e¤ective consumption quantity is the product of physical
quantity and the corresponding quality. In addition, quality is also subject to
the law of diminishing marginal utilities.
As consumers maximize their utility every period without any intertemporal
choice, they e¤ectively have the maximal life-time utility. The discount factor
is  2 (0; 1). Later, rms will be assumed to have the same discount factor.
2.2 Firms
Production has two dimensions: quality and quantity, which will be specied in
the corresponding order. First, rms X and Y are respectively characterized by
the know-how stocks kx and ky. A larger know-how stock embodied in a superior
blueprint bears the notion of technological progress. A know-how stock ki for
i 2 fx; yg is related to its corresponding quality index i by a common valuation
function (). Specically i = (ki) where (0) = 1, 0()  0, 00()  0, and
limki!1 
0(ki) = 0. A specic valuation function is illustrated by Figure 1.
In words, with a larger know-how stock, a rm can produce a new product
generation which is more appreciated by consumers. For simplicity, we assume
that there is a threshold know-how stock k beyond which consumers do not
see a di¤erence, i.e. (ki) = 
 8ki  k.
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Figure 1. Valuation function (ki)
Product supremacy is tied to the ordering of x and y, e.g. rm X has the
supremacy if x > y, or equivalently kx > ky for kx; ky < k. Firms can spend
on R&D to accumulate more know-how. Again, let i = fx; yg. The evolution
function of a know-how stock is
k0i =

ki + s (i) with probability i
ki with probability 1  i; (2)
where (0) reads as next period only for state variables; i 2 [0; 1] is the invest-
ment intensity or success rate; and s() is the innovation step function with
s(0) = 0, s0(i) > 0, and s00(i)  0. As s() is continuous and dened on [0; 1],
it is bounded from above by the constant s = s(1). It is costly to carry out R&D
projects. Let c(i) be the innovation cost function where c : [0; 1]  ! [0;1),
c0()  0, c00() > 0, i.e. it is too costly to have success for sure. It is noted that
the linear accumulation technology does not change over time, while the curva-
ture of () does vary and will govern investment behaviors. Thus, to support
the notion of a xed technological structure, rms are not modeled to directly
choose their quality indices.
Di¤erent from the quality ladder, a continuous step function implies con-
tinuous quality indices and equilibrium price ratios, which signicantly enrich
the set of competition strategies. Potentially, the step and success rate can be
modeled as separate choices. However, to keep the model and its computation
tractable, the step is assumed to be a positive function of the success rate. In
other words, rms decide on how far they want to progress next period and
their e¤orts are subject to some uncertainty. E¤ectively, the expected innova-
tion step is an increasing function of the R&D e¤ort which is normalized to live
in [0; 1]. In addition, we restrict s() so that the expected step is convex in e¤ort
(Appendix 1).
Finally, rms face no capacity constraints. In addition, it costs w units of
the numeraire to produce one unit of either x or y. Unit cost w does not depend
on the know-how stocks. Consequently, it is optimal for rms to produce with
the most superior blueprint, i.e. at the highest quality level.
2.3 Timing and Equilibrium Concepts
Later analyses will deal with investment performance and welfare properties by
a monopoly, a duopoly, and a social planner. Both the monopoly and social
planner can control all activities of the rms. These three considerations share
a general timing.
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First, at the beginning of each period, all agents observe quality levels. Sec-
ond, rms decide on prices and the associated non-negative production volumes.
In the duopoly case, rms compete in prices, i.e. engagement in a Bertrand
game. It is assumed that production and purchase take very small amount of
time. Consequently, rms pay all factor costs at the beginning of the period after
they collect revenue from consumers. Third, right after the revenue collections
and productive factor payments, rms decide on a non-negative investment in-
tensity of potential R&D projects. Firms can nance R&D expenses from their
prots or borrowings. Assume that rms can borrow up to the amount they
want at the market interest rate r = 1=   1, and they borrow only for in-
vestments. In addition, principal and interest payments are enforced so that
if a rm does not pay back it will su¤er some money-equivalent punishment.
For example, if the rm borrows c to pay for R&D activities, the discounted
future payments count  c to the present value. These assumptions mean that
there are no di¤erences between self-nancing and borrowing, and rms have
no e¤ective budget constraints. An investment of c > 0 is desirable only if the
expected present value of future gains is strictly greater than c. If a rm de-
cides to invest, it will choose the optimal intensity to maximize the -discounted
sum of prot ows. In the duopoly setting, rms have simultaneous Markovian
strategies which constitute an MPE. Finally, the outcome of any R&D project
is realized at the beginning of the next period, either a success or a failure.
In this setup, innovation investments depend on know-how stocks or quality
levelsthe state, and pricing does not a¤ect the evolution of the state. Thus,
price decisions (static) do not a¤ect investment strategies (dynamic).
3 Linear Substitution and Behaviors
For expositional simplicity, especially when dealing with welfare, we take linear
substitution, i.e.  = 1, as the base case and carry out necessary analyses
in this section and the next one. As products are linearly substituted, it is
later shown that generically only one product, either x or y, is consumed every
period. Simultaneous consumption only occurs when x and y have the same
quality levels. In section 5, we will look at the non-linear substitution case
where  2 (0; 1).
3.1 Utility Maximization
With a quasi-linear preference, consumers maximize their utility by rst choos-
ing the budget share b = B   z and then distributing this amount on products
x and y. Given that money is optimally spent on x and y, b is chosen at the
point where its marginal utility is one.
Lets look at how consumers distribute b on the two competing products.
Given prices, consumers solve the following sub-problem
max
x;y0
u(xx+ yy) s.t. pxx+ pyy = b: (3)
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Dene px=x and py=y as quality-adjusted prices (QAP). In this linear substi-
tution case, consumers only buy from the rm who o¤ers a lower QAP. When
the two QAPs are equal, we assume that consumers demand x = y. Details of
these two cases are as follows.
First, if only product x is consumed (without loss of generality) and hence
x = b=px, b 2 (0; B) is chosen to maximize u(xb=px)+B b with the rst-order
condition (FOC) (x=px)u0(xb=px) = 1. The optimal allocation is
fx; y; zg = fb=px; 0; B   bg: (4)
Second, if px=x = py=y = (px + py)=(x + y), by the above assumption,
x = y = b=(px+py). The budget share b is chosen to maximize u((x+y)b=(px+
py)) +B  b, or equivalently u(xb=px) +B  b. The FOC is the same as in the
rst case. Let b be the solution, the desirable consumption bundle is
fx; y; zg = fb= (px + py) ; b= (px + py) ; B   bg: (5)
Proposition 1 With the assumptions on consumer utility, in the two previous
cases, b(x; px) increases in x (and hence kx) and decreases in px. In other
words, consumers spend more on the innovation products if either quality is
higher or price is lower, and vice versa. Explicitly, b(x; px) = (x=px)(1 )=.
Proof. This is an application of the implicit function theorem, based on
initial assumptions of the utility function (Appendix 2)
In the following analyses, this consumption behavior will be taken into ac-
count by the agents in di¤erent market structures. There is a general observation
that, as unit costs are independent of quality, agents only consider producing
products with their latest generations.
3.2 Monopoly Pricing and Investment
The monopoly e¤ectively controls two rms and form a perfect cartel, as like
that in Ericson and Pakes (1995). Starting with a zero know-how stock and a
normalized quality indices f1; 1g, a monopoly maximizes its discounted innite
life-time prot by deciding on prices and R&D investments every period.
Static Pricing. The rst observation is that, in every period, the monopoly
only produces and sells one product. Proposition 1 shows that revenue is in-
creasing in quality. In addition, unit costs of x and y are the same. Thus,
the monopoly only commercializes either the product with quality supremacy,
or assumably x in the case of equal quality levels. Assume now that x is the
chosen product as its quality is at least as high as that of y. The monopoly
chooses a price to maximize the one-period prot, i.e. maxpxfx(px   w)g, or
equivalently
max
pxw

b(px)

1  w
px

: (6)
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The rst term is a decreasing function of price, while the second is increasing
in price. In fact, the prot maximization problem is well dened (Appendix 2),
and the optimal price is
px =
w
1   : (7)
Next, the monopoly one-period prot function takes the closed form
M (kx) = 

(1  ) x
w
(1 )=
: (8)
It is noted that the price function does not depend on quality, which comes from
the quasi-linear form. Whereas, the prot function is increasing in k or kx. In
addition, for   1=2, it is straightforward to show that the rst-order derivative
M1 (kx) is decreasing in kx. Thus the prot function 
M (kx) is concave in kx.
Dynamic Investment. The second observation is that the monopoly only
wants to innovate only one product line, without loss of generality x, from the
beginning. As noted earlier, the R&D technology, i.e. innovation step and
cost functions, does not depend on time and state fkx; kyg. In addition, only
the technology frontier maxfkx; kyg matters to prot ows. Specically, higher
frontiers mean larger prots, as in (8). The argument runs as follows. Given any
state fkx; kyg, the monopoly considers allocating a total cost of c on innovations
to expectedly further the frontier the most, in the next period. Recall that the
expected step function s() is strictly increasing in the e¤ort. Consequently,
for the same R&D cost, it is the most benecial to spend all of the e¤ort on the
technology frontier. In particular, when kx = ky  0, it is optimal to innovate
only one of the two, and we assume the monopoly chooses x.
We have just claimed that the monopoly innovates only x from the beginning.
Given the reduced state kx, the Bellman equation is
VM (kx) = max
x0

M (kx)  c (x) + ExVM (k0x)
	
; (9)
where ExV
M (k0x) = xV
M (k+x )+(1  x)VM (kx), and k+x = kx+s(x) when
the R&D project succeeds. The Euler equation is
 c0 (x) + 
 
VM
 
k+x
  VM (kx)+ xM1  k+x  s0 (x)  0; (10)
where equality holds if x > 0 and the subscripts mean derivatives. It is observed
that, by the envelop theorem, VM (kx) inherits the concavity from M (kx).
Equation (9) species a standard dynamic programming problem which has
a unique solution. Far into the future, if at kx  k, the optimal investment
intensity is apparently zero, and fM (k) ; VM (k)g are well specied. Thus,
by backward induction the monopoly can solve for the entire optimal time path
for its product quality.
There exists a know-how level kM  k on and beyond which the monopoly
does not want to invest. Clearly, at k and beyond, the second term of the LHS
of (10) is virtually zero and the monopoly has no incentive to progress. Even
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before reaching k, if VM1 (kx) and 
M
1 (k
+
x ) tend towards 0 fast enough, the
monopoly stops innovations, even though limx!0 c
0(x) = 0. In addition, we
observe that
Proposition 2 In the monopoly structure, for the range of kx where x > 0,
the optimal investment intensity is decreasing in kx (Appendix 3).
Proof. This is an application of the implicit function theorem, based on the
concavity of the prot function and the second-order condition (SOC) of the
Bellman equation (Appendix 4)
Social Welfare. With a quasi-linear utility form, social welfare is the sum of
consumer utility and monopoly prot as the number of numeraire units. At each
state kx, consumer utility in equilibrium and the ow of social welfare respec-
tively are UM (kx) = u(xb=px)+B b and M (kx) = UM (kx)+M (kx) c(x).
Specically, they take the closed forms
UM (kx) =

1  

(1  ) x
w
(1 )=
+B; (11)
M (kx) =
 (2  )
1  

(1  ) x
w
(1 )=
  c(x) +B: (12)
Thus, the discounted life-time social welfare with a monopoly structure is dened
recursively as follows
WM (kx) =
1
1   (1  x)

M (kx) + xW
M
 
k+x
	
; (13)
where x = x(kx) > 0 and k+x = kx+ s(x(kx)). It is easy to nd the maximal
long-run social welfare WM (km) which is
WM (km) =
M (km)
1   : (14)
Based on (13) and (14), we can establish the timepath of life-time social welfare
backward from the maximal know-how stock km, and calculate the ex ante value
WM (0; 0).
3.3 Duopoly Pricing and Investment
For the purpose of welfare analysis, no entry and exit are allowed. In particular,
a rm making zero prot can stay forever in the market. The two rms compete
to gain market share in each period and race to improve product quality.
Static Pricing. As noted earlier, price decisions do not have e¤ects on
investments. Thus, both rms will charge a price no less than unit cost, i.e.
px  w and py  w. If quality levels are equal, the duopoly rms play a
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standard Bertrand game in which equilibrium prices are w, each rm produces
half of the quantity demanded, and both make zero prots.
The case of di¤erent quality levels is more interesting. Knowing consumer
behavior and conditional on quality levels, each rm wants to monopolize the
market by choosing a price which constitutes an innitesimally lower QAP. This
competition behavior is rational because the price e¤ect is very small while the
market share e¤ect is very large. As X and Y try to cut down each other in
QAP bit by bit, the laggard will hit the lower bound w rst, and hence the
front-runner with product supremacy has the advantage in pricing. Specically,
the front-runner will choose a price such that its QAP is at most " less than
that of the laggard at the lower bound. We assume that the equilibrium market
share holds at the limit as " ! 0. In addition, the laggard has no output and
still charges a price equal unit cost w in equilibrium.
If X is the front-runner, the rm monopolizes the market by conning its
price such that
w  px  x
y
w: (15)
Then, this strategic monopoly will pick the price that maximizes its one-period
prot. An earlier analysis shows that the prot function in price of an absolute
monopoly has a single peak. The strategic monopoly puts the constraints in
(15) on the domain of that prot function and can easily see the optimal price
as follows
px =

w= (1  ) if 1= (1  )  x=y
(x=y)w if 1= (1  ) > x=y: (16)
Recall that x = (kx) and y = (ky). Plugging the optimal price in (16)
into the prot function in (6), we have the prot function of the front-runner.
In the rst case, i.e. 1= (1  )  x=y, it is shown earlier that the prot
function is increasing in kx. In the second case, i.e. 1= (1  ) > x=y, price
px is increasing in x and decreasing in y. Consequently, as the price is on
the increasing side of a single-peaked prot function, equilibrium prot of a
front-runner is increasing in kx and decreasing in ky. In this second case, the
expression for the front-runner Xs prot is
D (!)f1=(1 )>x=yg =

y
w
(1 )= 
1  y
x

: (17)
In combination of the equal and unequal quality cases, let D (!), where
! = (kx; ky), be the prot function of rm X. Observe that D (!) = 0 if
kx = ky, and D (!) > 0 if kx > ky. Thus, total prot of the duopoly is either
zero or equal the prot of the front-runner.
Dynamic Investment. As mentioned earlier, we look for MPE of the
game. Markov strategies are strategies that depend only on payo¤-relevant
information of the history up to the current period. In denition, MPE are
equilibria in Markov strategies (Maskin and Tirole 2001). In our problem, the
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payo¤-relevant information in each period is the state ! = (kx; ky). The rms
base exclusively on this information set to play and not on how they reach that
information set. Specically, given ! and y, the Bellman equation for X is
V D (!) = max
x0

D (!)  c (x) + E(x;y)V D (!0)
	
; (18)
where !0 = (k0x; k
0
y), and for k
+
x = kx + s(x), k
+
y = ky + s(y),
!0 =
8>><>>:
 
k+x ; k
+
y

with probability xy
(k+x ; ky) with x (1  y) 
kx; k
+
y

with (1  x)y
(kx; ky) with (1  x) (1  y) :
By the same token, given ! and x, Y also has the same Bellman equation as in
(18) with necessary changes in the index labels. Additionally, a rule is needed
to pin down the interactions between the two.
Denition 3 A symmetric MPE in pure strategies of the duopoly R&D game
is the investment function (), which is associated with the discounted life-time
prot V D(), such that for any state ! = (kx; ky) 2 
  R2: given that rm Y
follows the policy rule (), rm X nds () as the optimal decisions for the
problem in (18); and vice versa, given that X plays (), Y also nds it optimal
to follow ().
We are interested in the existence, uniqueness, and characterizations of the
possible equilibria. Existence and uniqueness of MPE are discussed in Maskin
and Tirole (2001), and Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2005). In the current
environment, the policy function () is bounded by construction. Thus, we
expect that an MPE in pure strategies exists. The current setup does not
support closed-form solutions to the R&D game. However, we can address
existence and uniqueness in a special way. It is noted that an MPE must satisfy
the subgame perfection argument. The existence of the threshold k means that
equilibrium behaviors on and beyond a set of nodes, which lie on all possible
paths of the game, can be constructed in a straightforward way. Behaviors in
earlier nodes can then be solved by backward induction.
Specically, the backward induction argument is illustrated by Figure 2,
which describes a 2-dimensional state space of know-how stocks. From each
point ! = (kx; ky), the two rms consider moving upwards and to the right.
Recall that beyond k rms cannot raise their quality indices. The state space
is partitioned into areas A, B, C, and D, in which we need to solve for the
decision rule and value function.
First, in areas A, B, and C, we know that both rms have no incentive to
invest at all, and their value function is D(!)=(1 ). More specically, in area
A both rms cannot raise consumersvaluation by accumulating more know-
how and hence make zero prot. In area B, rm X does not invest because it
is already beyond k, and rm Y the laggard does not want to make losses
all the way to area A; where the expected prot is zero. By the same token, no
rms invest in area C.
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Figure 2. Duopoly: backward induction
Second, equilibrium value and investment functions in area D are solved
by backward induction, which is illustrated by the arrows. Without loss of
generality, the reference rm is X. Let e! be the permuted state of !, i.e.e! = (ky; kx). Starting at the top right corner, rm X goes horizontally for
lower ky before going vertically for lower kx. Observe that at each point !,
future equilibrium investments and the associated value functions are known to
X. However,X does not know its value function and the competitors decision at
the current state !. By symmetry, the competitors decision at ! is the same as
rm Xs decision at e!, which is currently unknown. That means X needs to nd
its optimal investments at ! and e! simultaneously. For this reason, the state-
dependent consideration for X is called the pairwise xed point problem, which
is a component of the entire R&D game. Based on (18) and the corresponding
FOC (Appendix 5), the best response functions of rm X with respect to rm
Y s decisions at ! and e! can be constructed. Thus, existence and uniqueness of
the whole R&D game depend on the number of crossing points between these
two best response functions, which vary across area D. Specically, we have
existence and uniqueness if and only if the single crossing property holds for
each point on the state space. In the next section, we will implement this
backward induction solution in a discrete game.
Social Welfare. At each state ! = (kx; ky), the ow of social welfare is
D(!) = UD(!) + D(!)   c(x)   c(y), where UD(!) is consumers one
period utility. For kx  ky, UD(!) = u(xb=px)+B  b. For kx < ky, UD(!) =
u(yb=py) + B   b. Recall that there are two cases of front-runner pricing
depending on where x=y lies relative to 1=(1   ). It is more interesting to
focus on the second case where x=y < 1=(1   ) always holds. Under this
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assumption, the one-period utility when kx  ky is
UD(!) =

1  

y
w
(1 )=
+B; (19)
and the ow of social welfare is
D(!) =

1
1    
y
x

y
w
(1 )=
  c (x)  c (y) +B: (20)
Recursively, the discounted life-time social welfare function in ! is
WD (!) = D(!) + E(x;y)W
D (!0) ; (21)
where !0 and the integration E(x;y) are dened in (18), and fx; yg follow
() which is an MPE in denition 3. It is expected that the maximal long-run
social welfare is WD (!) where ! = (k; k). By backward induction, we can
calculate the ex ante social welfare WD (0; 0).
3.4 Social Planning
The social planners objective is to maximize consumersdiscounted life-time
utility by controlling rmspricing and investment activities. As in the monopoly
structure, the social planner needs to produce and innovate only one prod-
uct line, assumably x. Given the quality x, the social planner charges a
price equal unit cost w in every period. The one-period utility function is
US(kx) = u (xb=w) +B   b, and explicitly
US(kx) =

1  

x
w
(1 )=
+B: (22)
In (22), US(kx) is increasing and concave in kx. The social planner is interested
in the following Bellman equation
V S (kx) = max
x0

US(kx)  c (x) + 

xV
S
 
k+x

+ (1  x)V S (kx)
	
: (23)
The FOC of (23) is
 c0 (x) + 
 
V S
 
k+x
  V S (kx)+ xUS1  k+x  s0 (x)  0; (24)
where equality holds for x > 0. Again, by the envelop theorem, V S1 (kx) =
US1 (kx) > 0 and V
S
11 (kx) = U
S
11(kx) < 0. Like in the monopoly, we have
Proposition 4 In the social planning scheme, in the range of kx such that
x(kx) > 0, investment e¤ort is decreasing in kx, i.e. 
0
x(kx) < 0.
Proof. The argument follows the same line as in proposition 2
In this structure, observe that the discounted social welfare WS(kx) =
V S (kx). Let kS be the threshold on and beyond which the social planner does
not nd it benecial to innovate. By backward induction, we can also nd the
maximal long-run social welfare and ex ante value WS(0; 0).
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3.5 Comparisons of Social Welfare
Let a gross social welfare ow be the sum of utility and prots. Thus GM (kx) =
UM (kx) + 
M (kx); GD(kx) = UD(kx) + D(kx) for kx  ky; and GS(kx) =
US(kx) + 
S(kx). Respectively, these functions have the closed forms
GM (kx) =
h
 (2  ) (1  )1= 2
ix
w
(1 )=
+B; (25)
GD (kx; ky) =

1
1    
y
x

y
w
(1 )=
+B; (26)
GS (kx) =


1  

x
w
(1 )=
+B: (27)
In comparison of the three market structures, there are some observations. First,
GS(kx) > 
GM (kx). This result comes from the fact that (2 )(1 )(1 )=
is an increasing function ranging from 0:75 to near 1, for  2 [ 12 ; 1). Second,
GS(kx)  GD(kx; ky). The reason is GD(kx; ky) is increasing ky which is
bounded by kx. In addition, when kx = ky, GS(kx) = GD(kx; ky). Third,
GD(kx; ky) > 
GM (kx). To see why, note that the ordering between the two
is equivalent to the ordering of
1
1    
y
x

y
x
(1 )=
;
which is increasing in y=x 2 [1=; 1], and
 (2  ) (1  )1= 2 :
Recall that x=y is bounded from above by 1=(1 ), i.e.  < 1=(1 ), which
implies 1= > (1   ). When y=x = (1   ), the former is equal the latter.
Thus, in the range [1=; 1], the former is strictly greater than the latter. Fourth,
by the same token, it is straightforward to show US(kx)  UD(kx) > UM (kx),
where US(kx) = UD(kx) for kx = ky. In combination, we have established
Lemma 5 For  < 1=(1   ), and kx  ky, GS(kx)  GD(kx; ky) >
GM (kx), which means gross social welfare ow is the largest in social plan-
ning and smallest in monopoly. In addition, the utility components of these
functions also have the similar ordering, i.e. US(kx)  UD(kx) > UM (kx).
Proposition 6 Social planning dominates monopoly in both dynamic social
welfare and R&D e¤orts, i.e. WS(kx) > WM (kx) and 
S(kx)  M (kx) 8kx;
in addition, social planning dominates duopoly in social welfare, i.e. WS(kx) 
WD(kx; ky) 8kx  ky.
Proof. Appendix 6
At this point, we do not have analytical solution to the duopoly problem.
Hence, further comparison results need to rely on di¤erent numerical exercises
in the next sections.
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4 Numerical Characterizations
Based on specic parameterization, this section further characterizes investment
behaviors and welfare properties of the three market structures, i.e. a monopoly,
a duopoly, and a social planning scheme, in the linear substitution case where
 = 1. As the focus is theoretical analyses, we do not attempt to calibrate the
model to any specic markets. The benchmark values of the parameters are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Benchmark parameter values
Description Specication
Curvature of CRRA utility  = 0:8
Curvature of CES sub-utility  = 1
Interest rate r = 5%
Intertemporal discount factor  = 0:952
Consumer budget B = 0
Production cost w = 1
Know-how space k 2 f0; 1; ::; 2000g; k = 1800
Valuation function (k) = k + 1;  = 0:4;  = 0:25
Choice of success rate  2 f0; :01; :02; ::; 1g
Innovation step function s() =  ;  = 100
Innovation cost function c() =  (1 ) ;  = 0:02;  = 5
There are some notes on the choice of parameter values. First, the CRRA
utility function is concave, i.e.  < 1. This condition means consumers will
demand more of a product if its quality is increasing. In addition,   12 holds
to guarantee that one-period prot functions are concave. Second, the interest
rate is assumed to be at the annual level r = 5% which is often used by the
literature. The discount factor then follows  = 1=(1+r). It is noted that period
length is not necessarily one year. Third, the budget constraint B does not play
any role at this point and is normalized to be zero. Fourth, production cost w
is set at 1 for simplicity. Fifth, the know-how space is composed of integers in
[0; 2000], and hence the state space 
 is a discrete grid. Sixth, the curvature of
the valuation function lies in , and (; ) are chosen to guarantee  < 1=(1 ).
In addition, the valuation function is normalized so that the lowest quality is
1. Seventh, for compatibility, the step function maps each  to exactly a point
on the know-how space, and the parameter  governs the step sizes. Eighth, in
the innovation cost function,  determines the curvature and  plays the role of
a scale. Finally, given the benchmark know-how space, the three characteristic
functions, i.e. valuation, innovation step, and innovation cost, are constructed so
that rms stop innovations relatively long before reaching k. The reason is that
if it is optimal to innovate in the proximity of k, the investment functions in that
proximity become bumpy and look like waves bouncing from a sea wall. Clearly,
this phenomenon comes from the abrupt change in the valuation curvature at
k. Alternatively, given the characteristic functions, we can expand the state
space to avoid this phenomenon. However, a larger state space means a heavier
computational burden, especially in the duopoly case.
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4.1 Social Planner vs. Monopoly
We begin with the comparison between the social planner and monopoly in
terms of innovation e¤ort and social welfare. The comparison is simplied by
the fact that these market structures evolve e¤ectively in one dimension, i.e. kx.
Figure 3. Social planner vs. monopoly: R&D intensity
Note:  = 1; social planner investment follows (24); monopoly investment
follows (10). Planner always makes more R&D e¤orts than monopoly.
Figure 4. Social planner vs. monopoly: social welfare
Note:  = 1; planner welfare follows (23); monopoly welfare follows (13);
the dots mark the maximal social welfare levels.
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R&D e¤orts and social welfare are presented in Figures 3 and 4. There
are some major results in this comparison. First, as shown earlier, both the
social planner and monopoly reduce their innovation e¤orts over the know-how
space, and eventually hit some points beyond which no further investments are
benecial. Second, the social planner always exerts more e¤ort on innovations
and reaches a higher maximal know-how stock than the monopoly. It is noted
that the social planner makes innovation decisions based on a ow function
larger and steeper than monopoly one-period prot. Third, though with more
expenditures on R&D, the social planning scheme has higher life-time welfare
than the monopoly structure. The reason is that the net social welfare ows are
still high. In addition, the social planner has more chance to succeed in R&D
e¤orts and hence more e¤ectively avoid wasteful investments than the monopoly.
Thus, at the beginning, i.e. kx = 0, ex ante social welfare in social planning is
larger than that in monopoly. Moreover, in the long run, the economy reaches
a higher steady-state quality level and social welfare in the former than in the
latter (the dots in Figures 3 and 4).
4.2 Duopoly Behavior
Static Pricing. In the linear substitution case, product supremacy is all
that matters. Figure 5 illustrates the pricing behavior and prot of rm X. As
a laggard, X ties its price at w and makes a zero prot. As a front-runner, the
rm can charge a higher price which is subject to the quality ratio. Specically,
the front-runners price and prot are higher if its relative quality is larger.
The curvature of price and prot functions along kx comes from consumers
valuation.
Figure 5. Duopoly: price and prot functions of rm X
(A) (B)
Note:  = 1; < 1=(1  ); price follows (16); prot follows (17). Higher
quality levels lead to higher prices (A) and higher prots (B).
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Dynamic Investment. As discussed earlier, solving for an MPE of the
entire R&D game boils down to solving for a Nash equilibrium in every state
! 2 
, following a backward induction fashion. Recall that given ! = (kx; ky),
behaviors at weakly higher states f!0g are already known, for !0 = (k0x; k0y),
k0x  kx, k0y  ky, and at least one of the inequalities is strict. In addition, in
every state !, by symmetry, we need to nd the xed point of the R&D game
between rm X and itself at the permuted state e!. In this game, players choose
the R&D intensity  in a nite and bounded set.
The numerical algorithm for nding the xed points is based on a simple
interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept. It runs as follows: given any
state !, construct the best response functions of the two rms and nd the xed
point on a grid choice space. In implementation, most of the state games have
exact xed points. For the state games which do not have exact xed points,
we approximate the equilibrium with the closest grid point which is not Pareto
dominated.
Figure 6. Duopoly: value and investment functions (rm X)
(A) (B)
Note:  = 1; value follows (18); investment follows denition 3. In (A),
higher rm values come from higher quality levels. In (B), X only in-
vests in a bounded region; R&D e¤orts are decreasing in kx; competition
escalades in the diagonal region.
There are some distinguished features of the numerical equilibrium play.
First, a rm may have expected positive value even when lagging in the market.
The reason is that if the know-how gap is not too large, the laggard has some
chance to catch up with the front-runner by R&D investments. Figure 7 shows
the region where the laggard still wants to catch up. Second, if too far behind,
the laggard does not invest in R&D. Third, the R&D race is the most intensied
when rms are close to each other, especially when they have equal know-how
stocks. In other words, rms really want to break the balance to have an
advantage in pricing. By comparing Figures 3 and 6.B, given kx = ky which are
both low, a duopoly rm invests more than the social planner at kx. Forth, even
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though the front-runner can leave the laggard so far behind that the laggard
will never invest in R&D, the front-runner still has incentives to invest as it can
raise the quality ratio for larger prots. Fifth, investment incentive generally
decreases in know-how stock, reecting the decreasing marginal valuation of
consumers. When consumers the most appreciate quality improvements, i.e. for
low know-how stocks or fresh market, rms invest intensively. When increases
in know-how stock cannot raise much consumers valuation, i.e. the market
becomes mature, no rms invest in R&D. Specically, Figure 7 illustrates the
boundary beyond which a front-runner no longer wants to innovate. It can be
seen that if the competitor ends up with low quality level, rm X does not
have much incentives to progress far. However, if the two rms make relatively
equal progress, they may push the frontier close to the social planners maximal
know-how stock.
Figure 7. Duopoly: investment boundaries (rm X)
Note:  = 1; upper curve species fmaximal kxg; lower curve & diagonal
make up the catching up region. Duopoly technology frontier lies between
those of the social planner and monopoly.
Social Welfare. Figure 8 shows how the duopoly social welfare function
looks like. It is symmetric with respect to the diagonal where the rms have
equal product quality and consumers benet the most. In addition, the domain
in which the society can e¤ectively achieve some welfare level is dened by the
technology frontier in Figure 7. In other words, social welfare evolves as long as
rms still make R&D e¤orts.
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Figure 8. Duopoly: social welfare function
Note:  = 1; social welfare follows (21). The function has a trench along
the diagonal where rms make a lot of wasteful investments.
Generally, the function is increasing in kx and ky. However, it is cleaved a
long the diagonal region. Given some ky and in the neighborhood where kx 
ky, the social welfare function becomes at. When kx passes ky, the function
becomes steeper, and again increasing and concave in kx. The reason is that
when neck-and-neck, rms intensify their competition e¤ort and make a lot of
wasteful investments from the point of view of social welfare.
4.3 Market Organization, Innovation, & Social Welfare
We compare the three market structures here. First, there is an important result
shown in Figure 7: the duopoly technology frontier is lower than that of the
social planner and higher than that of the monopoly. This means the long-run
social welfare of the structures follows the same ordering. Figure 9 illustrates
this result. It is interesting that if the duopoly rms always advance together
in equilibrium, they can drive social welfare to the level by the social planner.
Second, the ex ante social welfare value is the highest under the social planner
and lowest under the monopoly. Specically, the ex ante social welfare values
under a social planner, a duopoly, and a monopoly respectively are EWS = 102,
EWD = 98, and EWM = 80. Third, market organization does matter to the
rates of technological progress. The monopoly is the slowest. The order between
a social planner and a duopoly depends on where the rms are on the state space.
A duopoly in the diagonal region advances more quickly than a social planner
with the same technology frontier.
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Figure 9. Comparison of maximal welfare
Note:  = 1; social planner and monopoly only innovate x and keep
ky= 0; duopoly technology frontier is that of front-runner X . Duopoly
ranks lower than social planner and higher than monopoly in maximal
social welfare.
In combination of the results, the social planner benets the economy the
most; the duopoly may generate an outcome comparable to that by the social
planner, but not always; and the monopoly is denitely the least desirable.
This welfare result means that more static and dynamic competition benets
the society in both the short run and long run. Thus, policies related to market
organization and dynamics should work in this direction.
5 Nonlinear Substitution
We have analyzed investment behaviors and social welfare properties for the
linear substitution case. In this section, the same considerations are extended
to the nonlinear substitution case, where  2 (0; 1). Specically, the presented
numerical results are associated with  = 0:8. We want to see if the previous key
conclusions are invariant to the substitution specication. In fact, analyses with
nonlinear substitution are much more costly than those with linear substitution.
For the most part, the formulations of pricing and investment problems are
similar to those in the linear substitution case (Appendix 7). However, there are
some major di¤erences. First, consumers always want to consume both products
x and y, making the demand function more smooth. Consequently, second, the
monopoly and social planner have to produce and innovate both products in
every period. Third, the setup does not support closed form solutions to the
static problems, especially the duopoly pricing game. These mean that we have
to rely more on computations to characterize the nonlinear substitution case.
21
Figure 10. Technology frontiers (product x)
Note:  = 0:8. The frontiers show the maximal know-how stocks beyond
which rm X , under di¤erent market structures, will no longer innovate
product x. The same holds for product y.
Figure 11. Maximal social welfare (x frontier)
Note:  = 0:8.Maximal welfare values are associated with the technology
frontiers in Figure 10.
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Before investigating investment behavior and social welfare, we need to un-
derstand the role of quality in prot maximization. In the monopoly structure,
quality does not a¤ect optimal prices for large B, which also holds for the linear
substitution case. However, quality has the budget share e¤ects, i.e. higher
quality attracts more expenditure from consumers. This is the incentive for
quality innovation in monopoly. In the duopoly structure, the market share for
each rm and consumer expenditure are both tied to quality levels. In fact, a
rms one-period prot is increasing in its product quality and decreasing in
that of the rival (Figure A.2-A). For this reason, rms are motivated to improve
their own product quality. Di¤erent from the market power incentive, the sole
interest of a planner is raising consumersutility through quality innovation.
Detailed characterizations of each market structure are presented in Appen-
dix 9. In this section, Figures 10 and 11 provide the main comparisons.
Figure 10 representatively shows the technology frontier of product x, beyond
which no rms want to make R&D e¤orts. First, the monopolys frontier is
low while that of the planner is much higher. However, the two structures
share the same pattern of decreasing innovation e¤orts along kx (Appendix 9).
This common feature is intuitive for a concave valuation function. Interestingly,
second, the duopoly frontier is not always lower than the planner counterpart. In
other words, if the stochastic evolution in equilibrium is unbalanced, a duopoly
structure may end up with a product with very high quality and the other
with low quality. The reason is that if the competitor is not lucky in its R&D
projects and stays at low product quality, rm X will nd it benecial to raise
its relative quality. As a sole innovator, neither a social planner nor a monopoly
has incentives to progress in an unbalanced fashion, even though they may end
up with unequal quality states as the economy evolves stochastically.
Thus the linear and nonlinear substitution cases di¤er greatly in duopoly
innovation behavior. First, for a low ky, rm X invests to improve its product
longer with nonlinear substitution than with linear substitution; In addition,
rm Xs innovation intensity is increasing in ky with linear substitution, while
the reverse holds with nonlinear substitution. This di¤erence is intuitive. In
the linear substitution case, a rm too far behind abandons R&D e¤orts all
together, and the front-runner can sustain its leadership without much e¤ort; As
the laggard lands at a higher quality level, the front-runner needs to innovate its
product up to some optimal point, making the frontier increasing. In contrary,
the laggard with nonlinear substitution can always make positive prots because
consumers demand its product; Consequently, the laggard has greater incentives
in raising its market share via quality innovation. Knowing this, the front-runner
will need to make more e¤orts to have a greater lead. As the additional curvature
for  < 1 makes it more costly to raise relative quality, a rms investment
frontier is decreasing in product quality of its rival. For example, for a low ky,
rm X nds it easy to have greater lead and has a high frontier. However, for
a higher ky, it is not benecial for rm X to go as far. When X is a laggard
and ky is increasing, the rms marginal benets from innovation is smaller and
smaller. Second, R&D e¤orts are not intensied when rms are neck-and-neck
with nonlinear substitution. The reason is that the laggard does not have to
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face a hazard of making future zero prots as in the linear substitution case.
Finally, the social welfare functions of all three market structures are in-
creasing and concave in ! (Appendix 9). As rms do not intensify investments
when they are neck-and-neck, the social welfare function is not cleaved as in the
linear substitution case. There are some main comparative results. First, wel-
fare values conditional on states are unambiguously ordered. Specically, given
any state !, it is always benecial to switch from a duopoly to social planning or
from monopoly to duopoly. This implies the ex ante social welfare value is the
highest under a social planner and lowest in a monopoly. Recall that this result
holds in the linear substitution case. Second, the maximal social welfare value
depends on where the economy lands along the technology frontier. Specically,
the monopoly always produces the smallest social welfare. In dynamics, the
duopoly may generate higher welfare than the social planner. However, in the
long run, the latter benets the economy the most (Figure 11).
Though there are di¤erences in terms of duopoly investment behavior, the
linear and nonlinear substitution cases share the same policy message that more
competition benets the economy.
6 Further Discussions
We consider some issues related to the choice of parameters and modeling in
this section. First is how the results will change if we vary the key parameters
regarding innovation step and cost functions. In general, varying the innovation
technology does not a¤ect the comparative results between di¤erent market
structures, given linear substitution or nonlinear substitution. In particular, if
it is easier to innovate, i.e. the step function is higher or the cost function is
lower, rms will make higher innovation e¤orts, given a some state !. It is noted
that the continuous step function is implemented on a grid space. Thus, any
change in the step function has to satisfy the condition that intensity decisions
advance the state to exact grid points.
Second, we do not have to vary the valuation function to see how the model
works, because its curvature varies with know-how stocks. Specically, for each
market structure and substitution degree, the key determinant behind innova-
tion incentives is the curvature of the valuation function; For low know-how
stocks, where the valuation function is steep, the marginal benets of innova-
tion is large and rms make great R&D e¤orts; In the long run, as the valuation
function is at, rms have small incentives in product improvements.
Third, the current choice of the threshold k is a technical assumption which
makes the solution concepts more understandable and keeps the state space
small enough for computational purposes. The key welfare results do not depend
on the choice of k. Ideally, k should be chosen so that the corresponding slope
of the valuation function, i.e. 0(k), is smaller than any other magnitudes
considered in R&D problems. For a large k, investment decisions are not
subject to bouncing e¤ects and look smoother. However, as k is increasing,
the computational burden grows exponentially. Thus we have to make a trade
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o¤ between smoothness and feasibility.
Fourth, we do not consider the dependence of production cost w on know-
how stock. If unit cost is increasing in quality, we also expect that innovation
intensity is decreasing. In empirical work, changes in production cost may be
needed to make the model match with data. However, in this study, the assump-
tion of an invariant unit cost is necessary to keep the model focus on quality
innovation. In addition, real-life developments show that quality innovation is
not necessarily associated with higher production cost. For the same reason
of simplicity, we keep the innovation technology, i.e. innovation step and cost
functions, independent of know-how stock.
Fifth, states are not allowed to move backwards. This assumption facil-
itates backward induction solutions and di¤erentiates the current study with
the existing literature, e.g. Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Doraszelski (2003).
Clearly, the evolution rule, according to which a state ! follows, does inuence
rmsinnovation incentives. In general, given the same e¤ective state space 
,
the measure of ! such that some rm does not invest is larger with the nonde-
creasing fashion. In addition, the long-run outcomes, especially in technology
frontier, are di¤erent.
Finally, we restrict the game theoretic equilibrium concepts to Nash and
MPE. Finer concepts which may rely on Folks theorem are beyond the scope of
our current interest. Those ner considerations demand much more elaborations
and are left for future work.
7 Conclusion
The main purpose is analyzing how market organization a¤ects the quality in-
novation e¤orts and social welfare. The key technology structure is that rms
can choose how much to progress in the next period and state variables are
non-decreasing. There are some main results. First, in the linear substitution
case, the planner technology frontier is always superior than the counterparts in
duopoly and monopoly. Second, in the nonlinear substitution case, a duopoly
may follow an unbalanced evolution path and have a technology frontier not
dominated by that in social planning. Third, social welfare values are always
the highest in social planning and the lowest in monopoly.
We can extend the model in at least several ways. On one hand, some of
them may not add much intuition to the current results. On the other, some
potential extensions deserve separate research projects. Consequently, we keep
the model as simple as possible to focus on the e¤ects of market organization
on innovation and welfare.
The analysis again advocates for the virtue of competition. Competition puts
a downward pressure on prices and provides the incentives for rms to repeatedly
expand the technology frontier, raising social welfare. However, it should be
borne in mind that intensied competition may lead to wasteful allocation of
resources.
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Appendix 1. Expected innovation step function
Given any e¤ort  2 [0; 1], the expected innovation step is sE() = s().
Observe that s0E() = s() + s
0() > 0. Consider the second-order derivative
s00E() = 2s
0 () + s00 ()
() s00E() = s0 () f2 + s00 () =s0 ()g :
This equation suggests that we choose s() = 1  , where  < 1 is the constant
rate of risk aversion. Thus, s00E() = s
0()(2  ) > 0, and the expected step is
convex in e¤ort.
Appendix 2. Properties of b(x; px)
To use the implicit function theorem, based on the common FOC, we con-
struct the following function: F (b; x; px) = (x=px)u0(xb=px)  1. With some
shorthand notations
Fb =

x
px
2
u00 < 0
F =
1
px
u0 +
xb
p2x
u00 =
u0
px
(1  rR) > 0
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Fp =  x
p2x
u0   
2
xb
p3x
u00 =  xu
0
p2x
(1  rR) < 0:
where rR =  (xb=px)u00(xb=px)=u0(xb=px). Note that @b=@x =  F=Fb and
@b=@px =  Fp=Fb. Thus @b=@x > 0 and @b=@px < 0. This also implies that
@b=@kx = (@b=@x)(@=@kx) > 0. We need these conditions hold unambigu-
ously, and the assumption rR =  2 [ 12 ; 1) is su¢ cient. In fact, based on the
original FOC
b(x; px) =

x
px
(1 )=
: (A.1)
Appendix 3. Monopoly Pricing
The monopoly solves maxpxfb(px) (1  w=px)g. Based on Appendix 2, the
FOC and its equivalent forms are
b0 (px) (1  w=px) + b (px)w=p2x = 0
()   (Fp=Fb) (1  w=px) + b (px)w=p2x = 0
()   (1  ) b
px

1  w
px

+
bw
p2x
= 0
() px = w
1   : (A.2)
Plug this result into (A.1), the optimal budget share for innovation products
and the monopoly prot are
b =

(1  ) x
w
(1 )=
(A.3)
M (kx) = 

(1  ) x
w
(1 )=
: (A.4)
Appendix 4. Decreasing optimal investments
Consider the equality in equation (10), which means x > 0. Let
F (kx; x) =  c0 (x) + 
 
VM
 
k+x
  VM (kx)+ xM1  k+x  s0 (x) :
By the implicit function theorem, 0x(kx) =  F1(kx; x)=F2(kx; x). Ob-
serve that at the optimal x, the SOC of the Bellman equation is F2 (kx; x) < 0.
In addition, by the envelop theorem, VM1 (kx) = 
M
1 (kx). Next, consider the
derivative
F1(kx; x) = 
 
M1
 
k+x
 M1 (kx)+ xs0 (x)M11  k+x  :
As M (kx) is a concave function, M1 (k
+
x ) < 
M
1 (kx) and 
M
11 (k
+
x ) < 0. In
combination, F1(kx; x) < 0, and hence 
0
x(kx) < 0.
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Appendix 5. Duopoly Investment
The Bellman equation in (18) is more specied as
V D(kx; ky) = max
x0
8>><>>:D(kx; ky)  c(x) + 
2664
xyV
D(k+x ; k
+
y )+
x(1  y)V D(k+x ; ky)+
(1  x)yV D(kx; k+y )+
(1  x)(1  y)V D(kx; ky)
3775
9>>=>>; :
The FOC, where equality holds if x > 0, for this problem is
 c0(x) + 
2664
yV
D(k+x ; k
+
y ) + xyV
D
1 (k
+
x ; k
+
y )s
0(x)
+(1  y)V D(k+x ; ky) + x(1  y)V D1 (k+x ; ky)s0(x)
 yV D(kx; k+y )
 (1  y)V D(kx; ky)
3775  0
()  c0(x) + 
2664 y
 
V D(k+x ; k
+
y )  V D(kx; k+y )

+xV
D
1 (k
+
x ; k
+
y )s
0(x)

+(1  y)
 
V D(k+x ; ky)  V D(kx; ky)

+xV
D
1 (k
+
x ; ky)s
0(x)

3775  0:
Finally, by the envelop theorem, the FOC is
 c0(x) + 
2664 y
 
V D(k+x ; k
+
y )  V D(kx; k+y )

+x
D
1 (k
+
x ; k
+
y )s
0(x)

+(1  y)
 
V D(k+x ; ky)  V D(kx; ky)

+x
D
1 (k
+
x ; ky)s
0(x)

3775  0; (A.5)
where equality holds if x > 0.
Appendix 6. Comparisons of social welfare
(i) WTS: WS (kx)>WM (kx) 8kx. Assume that the economy starts at
kx at time t and follows some feasible policy 
t = fjg1j=t. The existence of
a threshold k implies that there is a time T far into the future beyond which
both the monopoly and social planner do not innovate, i.e. j = 0 8j > T . This
means that dynamic values are nite. Formally, dynamic values are redened
as follows
WM
 
kx; 
t

= Et
8<:
T tX
j=0
GM (kx;t+j) +
GM (kx;T+1)
1  
9=; ;
WS
 
kx; 
t

= Et
8<:
T tX
j=0
GS(kx;t+j) +
GS(kx;T+1)
1  
9=; ;
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where GM () and GS() are gross welfare ows. Given that both the monopoly
and social planner follow the same t, they will land on the same know-how
stocks in all future paths. It is already established that GS(kx) > GM (kx)
8kx. Thus WS
 
kx; 
t

> WM
 
kx; 
t

. Further assume that t is optimal for
the monopoly. As B is large, t is also feasible for the social planner. Conse-
quently, the social planner does strictly better by just mimicking the monopoly
and hence by carrying out the optimal policy.
(ii) WTS: S(kx)  M (kx) 8kx. Our claim readily holds in two non-
mutually exclusive: for t > T , no one innovates; and M (kx) = 0 for some kx.
Consider all kx where 
M (kx) > 0 and the corresponding FOC is
c0 (x) = 
 
VM
 
k+x
  VM (kx)+ xM1  k+x  s0 (x) :
If the social planner chooses x, the marginal cost is also c0 (x); The marginal
benet is

 
V S
 
k+x
  V S (kx)+ xUS1  k+x  s0 (x) :
Note that M (kx) = [(1   )1=]US(kx), which implies US1 (kx) > M1 (kx) for
 2 [ 12 ; 1). Further, by the envelop theorem, V S1 (kx) = US1 (kx) and VM1 (kx) =
M1 (kx). By integration, V
S(k+x )   V S(kx) > VM (k+x )   VM (kx). Thus at
x, marginal benet is strictly larger than marginal cost. As these functions
are continuous in x, the social planner can always nd some " > 0 such that
marginal benet is still larger than marginal cost at x+", thereby raising social
welfare. This holds true for either decreasing or increasing marginal benets.
In words, if the monopoly chooses some x > 0 at some kx, the social planner
will make a strictly bigger e¤ort. This completes our arguments.
(iii) WTS:WS(kx) >W
D
(!) 8kx=max fkx;kyg. The argument follows
the same line in the comparison between social planning and monopoly. Observe
that only a front-runner makes positive prot ows; thus we can collapse the
duopoly state to be unidimensional and compare social planning with duopoly.
First, there exists time T beyond which no rms innovate, allowing us to trun-
cate the far future and compare nite sums of social welfare ows. Second,
Lemma 5 already established that GS(kx)  GD(kx; ky) 8kx  ky. Third,
by construction, the social planner can follow any evolution path of the quality
frontier in duopoly equilibrium with equal or less R&D costs and weakly higher
probabilities of success. Explicitly, let max(kx; ky) = maxf(kx; ky); (ky; kx)g.
Given kx, the social planner chooses max(kx; ky) and produces at the duopoly
frontier, which may be lower than that of social planning, in the next period.
Thus, the social planner can follow this policy rule, which is weakly suboptimal,
and makes higher social welfare than in duopoly.
Appendix 7. Nonlinear substitution: behavior and welfare
Consumption behavior. Consumers choose a budget share b given that
b is optimally distributed on the innovation products. First, given some b and
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prices, consumers solve the problem
max
x;y0
f(xx) + (yy)g s.t. pxx+ pyy = b;
with the FOC
x (xx)
 1
px
=
y (yy)
 1
py
:
Thus, the optimal consumption bundle is
x =
(px=x)
=( 1)
(px=x)
=( 1)
+ (py=y)
=( 1) b = Sx
b
px
; (A.6)
y =
(py=y)
=( 1)
(px=x)
=( 1)
+ (py=y)
=( 1) b = Sy
b
py
: (A.7)
Second, to solve for the optimal b, consumers maximize
max
b2(0;B)

u
 
xx (b)

+ y y (b)

+B   b	 :
Hence
b (x; y; px; py) = 
 [(xSx=px)

+ (ySy=py)

]
(1 )
; (A.8)
where  = 1=(1 +    ), and it can be shown that @b=@x > 0, @b=@y > 0,
which hold for  2 (0; 1). Thus given fx; y; px; pyg, where prices depend on
the market organization, we can calculate the one-period utility.
Monopoly structure. To maximize one-period prot, the monopoly solves
maxpx;pywfx(px   w) + y(py   w)g, where the demand functions are specied
earlier. Let the maximized prot function be M (!), which is the solution of
M (!) = max
px;pyw

Sx

1  w
px

+ Sy

1  w
py

b

:
Appendix 8 provides more details on this pricing problem. Next, to nd the
optimal R&D investments, the monopoly solves the Bellman equation
VM (!) = max
x;y0

M (!)  c (x)  c (y) + E(x;y)VM (!0)
	
.
Based on monopoly pricing, the one-period utility function UM (!) can be
constructed. Conditional on the state !, the ow of social welfare is
M (!) = UM (!) + M (!)  c (x)  c (y) : (A.9)
Given agentsmaximizing behaviors, discounted life-time social welfare is de-
ned recursively as
WM (!) = M (!) + E(x;y)W
M (!0) ; (A.10)
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based on which we nd the maximal long-run and ex ante social welfare values.
Duopoly structure. In every period, the rms engage in a Bertrand pricing
game. Given Y price, X chooses a price to maximize its prot
max
pxw

Sxb

1  w
px

:
Firm Y solves a similar problem. The FOCs of these problems constitute a
system which pins down the equilibrium price, conditional on the quality levels
(Appendix 8). The pricing game has an equilibrium (Caplin and Nalebu¤, 1991).
Observe that the maximized prot function is symmetric with respect to X and
Y . Thus if D(!) is the prot function for X, then D(e!) is the prot function
for Y , where e! is the permuted !. Given the one-period prot function, rm X
solves the Bellman equation
V D (!) = max
x0

D(!)  c (x) + E(x;y)V D (!0)
	
;
knowing that rm Y also solves a similar problem. Conditional on !, the FOCs
of these two Bellman equations constitute a system which pins down the equilib-
rium play in that state. Again, we can solve the entire R&D game by backward
induction, knowing that any rm will not invest further if already on and be-
yond k. The solution of the problem is a symmetric MPE (); which species
how much a rm will spend on R&D in a given state.
Given the pricing behavior of the duopoly conditional on !, we can construct
the one-period utility function UD(!). In combination, the ow of social welfare
is
D (!) = UD(!) + D(!) + D(e!)  c (x)  c (y) ; (A.11)
where x = (!) and y = (e!). Recursively, the discounted life-time social
welfare function is dened as
WD (!) = D (!) + E(x;y)W
D (!0) : (A.12)
Based on this equation, maximal long-run and ex ante social welfare values can
be constructed.
Social planning. The social planner is di¤erent from the monopoly in two
main aspects: (i) prices are set at unit cost; and (ii) investments are for consumer
utility rather than prot. As prices are set at unit cost w, the one-period utility
US(!) can be calculated according to (A.6)-(A.9). Thus the Bellman equation
is
V S (!) = max
x;y0

US(!)  c (x)  c (y) + E(x;y)V S (!0)
	
: (A.13)
Observe that the value function is exactly the discounted life-time social welfare
WS (!). Based on this value function, we can specify the maximal long-run and
ex ante social welfare levels.
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Appendix 8. Memoranda: monopoly & duopoly pricing
Monopoly. Here are more details about the monopoly pricing problem.
Numerical solutions to the pricing problem rely on the Newtons method with
analytical rst-order and second-order derivatives of the objective function. De-
ne
x =
q 1x
qx + q

y
;
y =
qy
 1
qx + q

y
;
b = 
 
x + 

y
(1 )
;
f =

1  w
x
x  
w
y
y

b;
where  = =(   1), qx = px=x, qy = py=y, and f is the objective function.
The rst-order derivatives are
@f
@px
=  

w
x
0x (px) +
w
y
0y (px)

b+

1  w
x
x  
w
y
y

b0 (px) ; (A.14)
@f
@py
=  

w
x
0x (py) +
w
y
0y (py)

b+

1  w
x
x  
w
y
y

b0 (py) ; (A.15)
where
0x (px) =
1
x

(  1) x
qx
  2x

;
0x (py) =  
xy
y
;
0y (py) =
1
y

(  1) y
qy
  2y

;
0y (px) =  
xy
x
;
b0 (px) =
b 
x + 

y
 h( 1)x 0x (px) + ( 1)y 0y (px)i ;
b0 (py) =
b 
x + 

y
 h( 1)x 0x (py) + ( 1)y 0y (py)i :
The second-order derivatives are
@2f
@p2x
=  

w
x
00x (px; px) +
w
y
00y (px; px)

b
 2

w
x
0x (px) +
w
y
0y (px)

b0 (px)
+

1  w
x
x  
w
y
y

b00 (px; px) ; (A.16)
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@2f
@p2y
=  

w
x
00x (py; py) +
w
y
00y (py; py)

b
 2

w
x
0x (py) +
w
y
0y (py)

b0 (py)
+

1  w
x
x  
w
y
y

b00 (py; py) ; (A.17)
@2f
@pxpy
=  

w
x
00x (px; py) +
w
y
00y (px; py)

b
 

w
x
0x (px) +
w
y
0y (px)

b0 (py)
 

w
x
0x (py) +
w
y
0y (py)

b0 (px)
+

1  w
x
x  
w
y
y

b00 (px; py) ; (A.18)
where
00x (px; px) =
1
x

(  1) 
0
x(px)qx   x=x
q2x
  2x0x (px)

;
00x (py; py) =  

y

0x (py)y + x
0
y (py)

;
00x (px; py) =  

y

0x (px)y + x
0
y (px)

;
00y (py; py) =
1
y

(  1) 
0
y (py) qy   y=y
q2y
  2y0y (py)

;
00y (px; px) =  

x

0x (px)y + x
0
y (px)

;
00y (px; py) =  

x

0x (py)y + x
0
y (py)

;
b00 (px; px) =
b 
x + 

y
 " (  1)( 2)x (0x(px))2 + ( 1)x 00x (px; px)
+ (  1)( 2)y
 
0y (px)
2
+ 
( 1)
y 00y (px; px)
#
;
b00 (py; py) =
b 
x + 

y
 " (  1)( 2)x (0x (py))2 + ( 1)x 00x (py; py)
+ (  1)( 2)y
 
0y (py)
2
+ 
( 1)
y 00y (py; py)
#
;
b00 (px; py) =


b0 (py)
 
x + 

y
  by	 
x + 

y
2 x
+
b 
x + 

y
 h(  1)( 2)x 0x (px)0x (py) + ( 1)x 00x (px; py)i
+
b 
x + 

y
 h(  1)( 2)y 0y (px)0y (py) + ( 1)y 00y (px; py)i ;
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with
x =
h
( 1)x 
0
x (px) + 
( 1)
y 
0
y (px)
i
;
y =
h
( 1)x 
0
x (py) + 
( 1)
y 
0
y (py)
i
:
Duopoly. Numerical solutions to the Nash pricing problem also rely on
the Newtons method with the analytical Jacobian of the system which is built
from rmsrst-order conditions with respect to prices. Let f(px; py) = (fx fy)0
where ffx; fyg are the rst-order derivatives of Xs and Y s prot functions
fxX ; yY g, respectively. Thus, a Nash equilibrium satises f(px; py) = 0.
We have
xX (px; py) = xb (px   w) ;
yY (px; py) = yb (py   w) ;
fx = (px   w) [0x (px) b+ xb0 (px)] + xb; (A.19)
fy = (py   w)

0y (py) b+ yb
0 (py)

+ yb: (A.20)
The associated Jacobian is
J =

fxx fxy
fyx fyy

; (A.21)
where
fxx = 2 [
0
x (px) b+ xb
0 (px)] +
(px   w) [00x (px; px) b+ 20x (px) b0 (px) + xb00(px; px)] ;
fyy = 2

0y (py) b+ yb
0 (py)

+
(py   w)

00y (py; py) b+ 2
0
y (py) b
0 (py) + yb
00(py; py)

;
fxy = [
0
x (py) b+ xb
0 (py)]+
(px   w) [00x (px; py) b+ 0x (px) b0 (py) + 0x (py) b0 (px) + xb00 (px; py)] ;
fyx =

0y (px) b+ yb
0 (px)

(py   w)

00y (py; px) b+ 
0
y (py) b
0 (px) + 0y (px) b
0 (py) + yb
00 (py; px)

;
and all of the expressions are the same in the monopoly pricing problem.
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Appendix 9. Nonlinear substitution: characterizations
Figure A.1. Monopoly: investment & social welfare
(A) (B)
Note:  = 0:8. In panel A, the monopoly only innovates product x at low
know-how stocks. In panel B, the social welfare function is increasing and
concave. Given the monopolys innovation behavior, the economy only
progresses for a short period of time and achieves a maximal welfare level
associated with low product quality.
Figure A.2. Duopoly: prot & social welfare
(A) (B)
Note:  = 0:8. In panel A, rm Xs one-period prot is increasing in its
product quality and decreasing in that of the rival; Hence, Xs innovation
incentive is greater when y is smaller. For low y , rm X innovates its
product all the way to k and faces bouncing e¤ects at this threshold; For
this reason, R&D e¤orts along this belt look bumpy; If k is large enough,
beyond which the slope of  is innitesimal, the bumpy e¤ects disappear.
In panel B, the welfare function is also increasing and concave.
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Figure A.3. Social planner: investment & social welfare
(A) (B)
Note:  = 0:8. In panel A, innovation investment in x is decreasing in
both kx and ky . In panel B, the planner social welfare function has the
same shape but higher value than those in the other two market structures.
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